In this paper, two general bidding systems are proposed to aid an owner to select one contractor based on multiple attribute decision making models. They are named the general multiple attribute lower bidder system and the general multiple attribute average-bid system which are an extension and a refreshment of the multiparameter bidding system and the average-bid method, respectively. The preference of the owner over the criteria (or attributes) relevant to construction work award is incorporated into the two new systems if necessary and required by the owner. The values of the attributes (excluding the cost) required to be determined by the owner in the multiparameter bidding system are not necessarily determined in the general multiple attribute lower bidder system. This reduces the burden of the owner. The two new bidding systems are demonstrated via an example, and are compared with the multiparameter bidding system and the average-bid method. The * This paper has been published by IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in Business and Industry, 11(3), 151-160, 2000. 2 comparisons show that the preference of the owner over the attributes relevant to selection of contractors has significant effect on the bid evaluation. Particularly, the two new systems still remain in the form of the competitive bidding concept and can easily be applied to practice.
Introduction
In many industries, a sizable proportion of business is attained through competitive bidding. For example, in the construction industry, contract bidding is widely used as a vehicle for distributing construction work to willing contractors.
Bids evaluation (or selection of contractors) is as important to the owner as bidding strategy formulation to the contractor (Nguyen, 1985) . Contractors observe quite frequently that the lowest bid does not necessarily win the project, and owners do not always find bids evaluation an easy task.
Currently, given that the owner has received the bids from a number of bidders for a specified project, the bids evaluation (or the process of selecting a contractor from these bidders) is mainly based on two typical kinds of systems. One kind of system called the single criterion bidding systems in this paper includes the lower bidder system with its variations and the non-lower bidder systems (including the averaged-bid methods).
Another kind of systems may be called the multiple criteria (or attributes) bidding systems (including the multiparameter bidding system).
In the lower bidder system, the bid price (or cost) is the only criterion for determining the successful bidder (the future contractor), namely, the lowest bidder is awarded to the project. Although this traditional system protects the public from extravagance, corruption, other improper practice by public officials, and the bidding process independent from any of pressure (political, social and economic) because of the sole criterion for evaluating bids, it has certain disadvantage, such as often resulting in unreasonably low bids either accidentally or deliberately submitted and unqualified contractors which may cause extensive delays in the planed schedule, cost overrun, very serious problems in quality, the increased number of claims, disputes, litigation, and so on (Herbsman and Ellis, 1992; Ioannou and Leu, 1993) . Over the years, some modifications to the lower bidder system were made. For example, "responsible bidder" and "public interest" has been added to the statutes to control the authority to let and award the projects. Other modifications created the concept of prequalified bidder lists, and so on.
However, not every country around the world is using the lower bidder system. Several countries and areas, including Italy, Portugal, Peru, and Taiwan, have developed the non-lower bidder systems to overcome the disadvantages as indicated above in which the successful bidder is not the lowest one. The philosophy behind this concept is that the best bid is the most reasonable one, not the lowest one, not the highest one, but the one closest to some average (Herbsman and Ellis, 1992) or the one that satisfies a certain relationship with the average of all the bid prices (Ioannou and Leu, 1993) . Several variations of this concept have been developed.
For example, one of such variations, the Peruvian government bidding system is presented in Henriod and Lanteran (1988) . Countries such as France and Portugal try to disqualify what they call abnormally low bids.
For more details about the above variations, see Henriod and Lanteran (1988) and Herbersman and Ellis (1992).
In addition, other variations are the average-bid methods being used in Italy and Taiwan (see Ioannou (1993) for more detail). In Taiwan, the winner might be the contractor whose bid price is closest to the average. In Italy, the winner might be the contractor whose bid price is closest to, but less than the average.
In order to overcome the disadvantage of the single criterion bidding system, a number of authors such as Diekmann, Herbsman and Ellis, Henriod and Lanteran, and Nguyen have developed another kind of bidding systems based on multiple attributes. The key idea of this kind of systems is that the selection process of the contractors is based on more attributes, such as bid price or cost, time, quality, managerial safety accountability, competence, and efficiency of contractors (Diekmann, 1981; Herbsman and Ellis, 1992; Nguyen, 1985) . The successful bidder is selected according to aggregation of scores or rankings on these attributes (Herbsman and Ellis, 1992; Nguyen, 1985) , as commonly used in multiple attribute decision modeling. Diekmann (1981) presented a study of contractor selection for a cost-plus contract based on multiple attributes. In his study, a wide range of attributes that may be used in selecting a contractor were discussed. Nguyen (1985) proposed a systematic procedure for the selection of contractors based on fuzzy set theory and multicriteria modeling.
Herbeman and Ellis (1992) analyzed the non-lower bidder systems and came to the conclusion that the non-lower bidder systems would not be generally accepted in the United States because of 150 years of a traditional competitive bidding system even though they have their merits. They were convinced that a total change from the lower bidder system would not be feasible in the short range and would be even more difficult to sustain in the long range. Only a major modification that would remain in the form of the competitive bidding concept would be accepted. In view of these consideration, they proposed a so-called multiparameter bidding system based on the idea that the selection process of the contractors will be based on more parameters (or attributes) than just cost. The successful bidder will be selected according to the lowest combined bidding value of the chosen multiple attributes.
However, there are still some problems existing in the multiparameter bidding system. For example, the method for determining the total bid scores for each bidder violates the independent principle between all the attributes in the multiple attribute decis ion modeling. The preference of the owner over the attributes is not incorporated into their system though it is mentioned in their system. In addition, the proposed system requires the owner to determine three multipliers (time value, quality value and safe value) which vary with different owners and different projects and difficult to be determined. This certainly burdens the owner greatly and is not suitable for practical application.
In this paper, based on the principle of multiple attribute decision modeling we will propose two general bidding systems (called the general multiple attribute lower bidder system and the general multiple attribute average-bid system, respectively) which are extensions and refreshments of the multiparameter bidding system and the average-bid method, respectively. The preference of the owner over the criteria (or attributes) is incorporated into the two new systems if necessary or required by the owner. Particularly, the values of the attributes (not including bid price) required to be determined in the multiparameter bidding system are not necessarily determined in the general multiple attribute average-bid system. As a result, the first system reduces the owner's burden. Particularly, the two new systems still remain in the form of the competitive bidding concept and can easily be applied in practice. Finally, the data given in Herbman and Ellis (1992) will be used to demonstrate the two new systems and compare them with the previous two systems mentioned above.
Review and Modification to the Multiparameter Bidding System
In order to state our ideas and compare them with the multiparameter bidding system, it is necessary to review the multiparameter bidding system in Herbman and Ellis (1992). The main idea of the multipara meter bidding system is that the selection process of the contractors will be based on more attributes than just cost, and the successful bidder will be the one who has the lowest combined bidding value of the multiple attributes. The major attributes selected by the owner are, cost, time, quality, and safety. The scores of these four attributes are transformed into values by multiplying some factors (namely, their unit values). Then the values of all the attributes for each bidder are totaled to get the combined bidding value for that bidder. Mathematically, the multiparameter bidding system can be expressed as below: performance records by the owner, respectively. The attribute quality is measured in "points per 100", and the attribute safety is measured in "points per $1,000,000" based on number of accidents per $1,000,000 cost and depending on the severity of the accidents (3 points for severe accidents, 2 points for medium ones, and 1 point for light ones). The factors T V and S V refer to the respective unit values of the attributes time and safety, respectively.
Herbeman and Ellis (1992) pointed out that in addition to the above attributes, there may be additional attributes, for example, safety (very important in tunnel and dam projects), security (in military projects), and so on, which would be specific to particular industries and can be incorporated into the system. Certainly, the agencies using the system would have the responsibility of figuring the weights and the quantification methods for these attributes.
The above system can be generalize to the case when the owner considers that the four attributes have
From the viewpoint of multiple attribute decision making (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) , the equation (2.1) is not sound and reasonable because of the dependence of the value of attribute quality on cost. In addition, the factors T V and S V are difficult for the owner to determine because of their variations with the different owners and different projects, and the unit value of any new attribute is required to determine by the owner whenever the attribute is incorporated into the system.
Two General Multiple Attribute Bidding Systems

Preliminaries
The selection of contractors (or evaluation of bids) is viewed as a multiple attribute decision making problem. The contractors are the alternatives, the parameters used to evaluate the bidders are the attributes, and the objective for the owner is to choose a bidder as a contractor who has the lowest combined bidding score or utility value. Certainly, the owner using these two systems would have the responsibility of selecting all the relevant attributes and figuring the weights and the quantification methods for these attributes in order to express his/her ideas. For example, some attributes (such as bid prices and time)
should be quantified by the bidders and some attributes (such as quality and safety) by the owner based on the bidder's past performance, and so on. 
Determination for the weights of the attributes
With respect to the determination of weights of the attributes, there are many methods that can be used. For example, AHP is a good method among them. Also, the method in Liu et al (1999) can be used. Of course, the weights can be given directly by the owner. The fixation attribute presented in Liu and Qiu (1998) means that the closer the attainment levels are to some fixed real number, the more preference for them. Thus, in the following general multiple attribute average-bid system to be proposed, the average bid is a fixation attribute. The formulae (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) for normalizing attributes can guarantee that the better the attainment levels of the attributes, the lower the corresponding normalized values. The reason for using the above equations to normalize a given attainment level for a given criterion will be explained later. However, we should indicate that the above methods for normalizing the attributes are not different from the normal methods as used in
Normalization for the attributes
Hwang and Yoon (1981) and Liu and Qiu (1998) where the better the attainment levels of the attributes the higher the corresponding normalized values.
A general multiple attribute lower bidder system
The combined bidding score of n attributes for bidder i, denoted by where the bid price is a cost attribute, and y ij can be determined by (3.1) for the profit attribute(s) and (3.2) for the cost attribute(s).
The owner using this system (abbreviated as GMALBS) should select the bidder with the lowest combined value of n attributes. Its reason is that the equations (3.1) and (3.2) for normalizing the profit and cost attributes are based on the idea that the better the attainment levels of attribute j X , x ij , the lower the corresponding normalized value y ij . Thus, this system still remains within the framework of the competitive bidding concept.
A general multiple attribute average-bid bidder system
The combined bidding score of n attributes for bidder i, denoted by i B 2 , is calculated by the Simple Additive Weighting Method as follow (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) :
where the bid price is a fixation attribute and y ij can be determined from (3.1) and (3.2) for the profit and cost attributes, respectively, and from (3.3) for the attribute bid price or cost.
Similarly, the owner using this system (abbreviated as GMAABS) should select the bidder with the lowest combined value of n attributes and the reason is the same as the general multiple attribute lower bidder system.
In addition, this system still remains within the framework of the competitive bidding concept.
Comparisons of Our Two Systems with Multiparameter Bidding System and the Average-Bid Method
Our two systems are demonstrated with the data in Herbersman and Ellis (1992) and are compared with both the multiple parameter bidding system and the average-bid method. Herbersman and Ellis assume that the owner will select a contractor based on four attributes ( cost, time, quality and safety). The evaluations of these attributes on each bidder are listed in Table 2 . 
Comparisons of the GMALBS with the multiparameter bidding system
Herberman and Ellis (1992) assumed that the parameters T V =$2000/day and S V =$1000/point and the four attributes are assumed to have same importance, i.e., ω 1 =ω 2 = ω 3 =ω 4 =0.25. The evaluations of the four attributes in Table 2 are normalized as the following Table 3 by using (3.1) and (3.2). Hence, in increasing order of preference the bidders is bidder B, bidder A, bidder C, bidder D for the GMALBS, and bidder A, bidder B, bidder C, bidder D for the multiparameter bidding system. The difference between the results for the GMALBS and the multiparameter bidding system consists in that the former is independent of the values (such as V T andV S ) of the attributes of time, quality and safety and the latter is dependent of them. In addition, the best bidder B for GMALBS accords with our visual observations, namely, the values of the three attributes (time, quality and safety) for bidder B are the best ones among the four bidders and the four attributes have the same weights.
However, if the owner considers that the weights of the attributes should be 1 B =806,000 by the general multiparameter bidding system. Thus, in increasing order of preference the bidders is bidder A, bidder D, bidder C, bidder B for both our system and . the multiparameter bidding system. Our preference ordering of the bidders is due to the larger weight of the attribute cost of 0.6 and the lowest costs of bidder A and bidder D. This shows the significant effect of weights of the attributes on selection of contractors. In practice, the attribute cost is more important than any other attributes.
Remark 1.
An extreme case of the GMALBS is the lower bidder system where the weight of attribute cost or bid price is 1 and the weights of all the other attributes are zero. Table 2 we can easily conclude that bidder A is preferred to bidder D for any weights of the attributes.
Remark 2. From
Comparisons of the GMAABS with the average-bid system
The evaluations of the four attributes in Table 2 are normalized as the following Table 4 by using (3.1) (3. 2) and (3.3) for the profit cost and fixation attributes, respectively. These results are due to the larger weight of the attribute cost of 0.6 and the bid price of bidder C is closest to the average of $1,187,500 among all the bidder's bid prices.
This illustrates the importance of weights of the attributes in contractor selection. In practice, the attribute cost is more important than any other attributes.
Conclusions
The competitive bid systems by which the project is awarded based on the sole criterion ( i.e., bid price or cost) has created many problems in past years. We consider that the main reason is that it ignores the importance of other attributes, such as quality, time, safety, and so forth.
Many authors have modified the original competitive concept and proposed some special systems in which some other important attributes such as quality time and safety are incorporated into the original competitive bidding concept (Diekmann, 1981; Herbsman and Ellis, 1992; Nguyen, 1985) .
In this paper, the bids evaluation problem is viewed as a general multiple attribute decision problem. The
Simple Additive Weighting method is used to solve this problem. Certainly, according to the specific environment we can also solve the bids evaluation problem by the other methods in Hwang and Yoon (1981) Weighting method as used in this paper; (v) the methods for information on alternative given, and so on.
The two general multiple attribute bidding systems (i.e., GMALBS and GMAABS) proposed in this paper provide good improvements on the multiparameter bidding system and the average-bid method, respectively.
The lower bidder system is a special case of the GMALBS and the average-bid method a special case of the GMAABS. The preference of the owner over the attributes (namely, the weights of the attributes) is easily incorporated into the GMALBS and GMAABS. Particularly, the value of the attributes (not including cost)
required to be determined in the multiparameter bidding system need not to be determined in the GMALBS.
Thus, GMALBS reduces the owner's burden. The data in Herberman and Ellis (1992) is used to demonstrate our two bidding systems and compare them with the multiparameter bidding system and the average-bid method.
The results of comparison have showed that the preference of the owner over the attributes relevant to contractor selection has significant effect on the bids evaluation. In addition, much emphasis should be on the importance of doing more research on quantification methods for the other attributes such as quality safety and security.
The proposed two systems have the potential of selecting a better contractor for the owner and improving construction performance of the chosen contractor. Their merits are the flexibility of the systems. As long as the attributes chosen, their system of measurement and their relativity weights are stipulated in the bid documents in detail, our two systems are still in accordance with the existing legal status of the current competitive bidding system.
